Anonymous and Separable Hedonic Coalition Formation Games: Nash Stability Under Different Membership Rights

Makale Bilgileri
Dergi: Business and Economics Research Journal
Makalenin Başlığı: Anonymous and Separable Hedonic Coalition Formation Games: Nash Stability Under Different Membership Rights
Yazar(lar): Mehmet Karakaya , Seçkin Özbilen
Cilt: 14
Sayı: 3
Yıl: 2023
Sayfa: 303-319
ISSN: 2619-9491
DOI Numarası: 10.20409/berj.2023.419
Öz
We consider hedonic coalition formation games. A hedonic coalition formation game is a pair which consists of a finite set of agents and a list of agents’ preferences such that each agent has preferences over all coalitions containing her. We study the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights for anonymous and separable hedonic coalition formation games. We prove that for anonymous and separable hedonic games, the existence of a Nash stable partition is always guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Approved Entry or Approved Exit-Free Entry, but the existence of a Nash stable partition is not guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Free Entry. We also analyze the relation of the anonymity and separability with the other sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Coalition Formation, Hedonic Games, Nash Stability, Membership Rights

JEL Sınıflandırması: C71, C78, D71

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