| Article Information |
| Journal: |
Business and Economics Research Journal |
| Title of Article: |
Anonymous and Separable Hedonic Coalition Formation Games: Nash Stability Under Different Membership Rights |
| Author(s): |
Mehmet Karakaya , Seçkin Özbilen |
| Volume: |
14 |
| Number: |
3 |
| Year: |
2023 |
| Page: |
303-319 |
| ISSN: |
2619-9491 |
| DOI Number: |
10.20409/berj.2023.419 |
|
| Abstract |
| We consider hedonic coalition formation games. A hedonic coalition formation game is a pair which consists of a finite set of agents and a list of agents’ preferences such that each agent has preferences over all coalitions containing her. We study the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights for anonymous and separable hedonic coalition formation games. We prove that for anonymous and separable hedonic games, the existence of a Nash stable partition is always guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Approved Entry or Approved Exit-Free Entry, but the existence of a Nash stable partition is not guaranteed when the membership rights are Free Exit-Free Entry. We also analyze the relation of the anonymity and separability with the other sufficient conditions which guarantee the existence of a Nash stable partition under different membership rights. |
| Keywords: |
Coalition Formation, Hedonic Games, Nash Stability, Membership Rights |
|
| JEL Classification: |
C71, C78, D71 |
|
